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Accountability is the ability to provide good reasons in order to explain and to justify actions, decisions, and 
policies for a (hypothetical) forum of persons or organizations. Since decision-makers, both in the private and in 
the public sphere, increasingly rely on algorithms operating on Big Data for their decision-making, special 
mechanisms of accountability concerning the making and deployment of algorithms in that setting become 
gradually more urgent. In the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation, the importance of accountability 
and closely related concepts, such as transparency, as guiding protection principles, is emphasized. Yet, the 
accountability mechanisms inherent in the regulation cannot be appropriately applied to algorithms operating on 
Big Data and their societal impact. First, algorithms are complex. Second, algorithms often operate on a random 
group-level, which may pose additional difficulties when interpreting and articulating the risks of algorithmic 
decision-making processes. In light of the possible significance of the impact on human beings, the complexities 
and the broader scope of algorithms in a big data setting call for accountability mechanisms that transcend the 
mechanisms that are now inherent in the regulation. 
Keywords: algorithms, accountability, privacy, data protection, non-discrimination 
1. Introduction 
Algorithms have been defined as finite, abstract, effective, compound control structures, 
imperatively given and accomplishing a given purpose under given provisions (Hill, 2016), or 
even more concisely, as encoded procedures through which input data is being transformed into 
a usable, and therefore desired, output (Gillespie 2012). Within the information society, 
algorithms perform a key function: by following a logical and mathematical sequence, 
algorithms can structure and find additional meaning in a Big Data environment. Although no 
single definition of Big Data exists, we agree with the definition posited by boyd and Crawford 
who refer to Big Data as the cultural, technological and scholarly phenomenon, in which 
technology is used to aggregate, analyse, link and compare large data sets with the aim of 
identifying patterns to make economic, social, technical and legal claims (boyd and Crawford 
2012). Whereas Big Data symbolizes the challenges raised by the explosive growth of data, 
algorithms, for instance, in the form of data mining techniques, represent their solution. 
Algorithms embody the techniques and software that are to be deployed if we wish to make 
sense of the data that is continuously being collected and produced, both offline and online 
(Colonna 2013, 330). In combination with data, they provide us with the knowledge we desire 
and the knowledge that we do not yet desire because we simply do not even have a clue before 
the algorithms do their work.  
 
Algorithms are already omnipresent: They serve a broad variety of purposes, in an equally 
broad variety of contexts, ranging from seemingly innocent kitchen-sink applications to highly 
critical societal endeavours. They can offer, for instance, personalised shopping advice or 
suggestions to improve one’s lifestyle; but they can also be deployed to determine potential job 
offers and positions, creditability, or being a suspect for the police or criminal investigations 
authorities. Even when algorithms are delegated daily tasks or processes, their deployment can 
impact the things, individuals and processes they interact with (Wilson 2016, 3). In their 
performance of daily chores, for instance, they can provide the corporations that exploit them 
with information about the persons for whom the chores are performed.  Many authors claim 
that algorithms impact identities, and as a consequence, opportunities granted in life, in various 
unobtrusive ways. The analytics within Big Data environments may thus cause a “fundamental 
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shift in our understanding of ourselves and our individual, social, cultural and political life” 
(Nerurkar et al. 2016, 3).  
 
Algorithms are powerful procedures. Consequently, there is a growing need to evaluate the 
claims, decisions, actions, and policies that are being made on the basis of them. This evaluation 
requires gauging the reasons for an algorithmic decision, its components, and the weight 
assigned to them. The assessment of algorithms is becoming increasingly difficult, however. 
As we will explain in the subsequent section, algorithms are complex. They seem to function 
behind an impermeable veil, not allowing of attempts to analyse the decision-making process 
and its outcomes. Algorithms are often perceived as a black box, and the environment they 
populate as a ‘black box society’ (Pasquale 2015).  
 
Ever since the large-scale introduction of personal computers and information technology, there 
has been a tendency to consider the social impact of data to fall within the scope of privacy and 
data protection laws and regulation. In Europe, data protection laws and regulations and – 
especially – the new General Data Protection Regulation (hereafter referred to as GDPR or 
“Regulation”) 1, emphasize the accountabilities of data controllers. As we will explain in section 
4, in many cases these accountability mechanisms cannot be meaningfully applied to data 
processing with the help of algorithms in a Big Data context. What form is this accountability 
to take when highly complicated algorithms are used and when the outcomes sometimes refer 
to other or more people than those involved in the input data? In this paper, we cannot answer 
this question in any detail yet. After a careful analysis of the specific complexities of algorithms 
in a Big Data context and of the accountability mechanisms explicitly and implicitly present in 
the GDPR we will, however, be able to come up at least with rudimentary contours of starting 
points for such an answer. In doing so, we try to stay close to the conceptual and normative 
basic assumptions of the Regulation. In particular, we try to cling to its predominant tendency 
not to close off useful options for the use of (personal) data from the outset, but to enable 
meaningful use in a responsible way with the help of accountability mechanisms.  
 
In this paper, we will concentrate on algorithms that process or produce data and information 
directly or indirectly referring to persons, either as individuals or groups. This does not at all 
mean that we assume that only those algorithms can have ethically relevant consequences. We 
strongly believe that the use of algorithms in Big Data contexts using and producing merely 
data or information about non-human entities, such as seeds, foods, medicine, meteorological 
circumstances et cetera can bring about important transformations in societies, cultures and 
societal practices, which in turn might affect the lives of humans significantly. Although we 
think that much of what we will say about algorithmic accountability also applies to algorithms 
used on data about things, focussing on the direct or indirect use of personal data enables us to 
make our points with regard to algorithmic accountability all the more clearly.  
 
                                                 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 




2. The Complexity of Algorithms in a Big Data Context  
 
Providing an account of an automated decision and assessing its social desirability will include 
an explanation and justification of the various elements that may have influenced the 
algorithmic outcome, and ultimately, the algorithmic decision. One of these elements can be 
the bias of an algorithm’s designer. As Wilson (2016, 3) noted, algorithms are human constructs 
and therefore the algorithmic process will almost necessarily assume, perhaps unwillingly, 
certain values.  Whilst it is true that algorithms are often value-laden due to design choices, the 
desirability of algorithmic decisions can often not be assessed through the evaluation of these 
choices alone. The assessment of algorithmic decision-making is also difficult due to their 
complex nature. Algorithms are complex in at least two ways: technically and contextually. 
These complexities are related to the nature of algorithms as such, i.e. mathematical 
constructions operating within a given context, of which the human factor of the possible bias 
of the designer is only one type of element to be taken in consideration.  
 
Technical Complexity  
Algorithms are encoded by a programmer in an algorithmic language before being translated 
into a machine-readable binary sequence. Algorithmic language is a language that is especially 
designed to express mathematical or symbolic computations and thus to express algebraic 
operations in a notation, reminiscent of logic and related to mathematics.2  In order to 
understand an algorithm, and in order to assess its decision-making capabilities, expert 
knowledge of the mathematical or system language used to build the algorithm is thus required. 
The general public to be affected by the algorithm will mostly not be in possession of this 
knowledge. Even computer experts, however, might have difficulty in understanding the 
algorithm’s actual behaviour in a Big Data setting although a computer system’s source code 
might be legible for them (Kroll et al, 2017, 6). Regardless of whether or not the language can 
be read, algorithms in a Big Data setting might still behave in unpredictable ways. Neither does 
the unpredictability depend on whether or not the algorithm as such is designed to be 
‘predictive’ or ‘descriptive’. Some algorithm’s decision-making processes, for instance, rely – 
sometimes in an essential manner – on randomization techniques (Kroll et al 2017, 22-24). 
Randomization, however, can severely limit the predictability of outcomes. In addition, 
algorithms are not necessarily used individually. Rather, ensemble approaches, where multiple 
algorithms are applied to a data set, can be used in order to determine the best solution or 
explanation to make sense of a given data set in varying industrial applications, such as credit 
scoring or Netflix ranking (Seni and Elder 2010, 7; Siegel 2013, Kitchin 2014, 2).  
 
The complexity of algorithms in a Big Data setting on a technical level is not restricted to the 
mathematical sequence. The technical context, in which the algorithms are ultimately deployed, 
is equally important. This complexity is of a structural nature. Algorithms do not operate in 
isolation, but perform functions as part of a larger structure. The primary constituents of a 
computer system are the underlying algorithms and data structures (Manovich 1999, 84). As 
such, algorithms are inert and without meaning; they need to be paired with databases (Gillespie 
2012). Before algorithms can produce results, information must have been collected, prepared, 
i.e. formalized in a manner that the algorithm can act on it automatically, and sometimes 
excluded or demoted, by subtly removing information through other algorithmic equations 
(Ib.).  Algorithmic accountability does not only require the examination of algorithms or the 
                                                 




code as such but also an examination of how algorithms are deployed within different areas and 
what the tasks are that they perform (Kitchin, 2016). The potential interconnectedness of 
algorithms and of algorithmic decisions also seriously restricts the means of algorithmic 
decision-makers to give an account of the decisions they make. If, for instance, an algorithmic 
decision builds upon the decisions made by a previous algorithm, the individual accountable 
for the latter decision, might not be aware of the decision-making process of the former. 
Consequently, he will only be able to provide an account of the logic applied during the later 
decision-making stage, but not the one applied during the preceding processes that may have 
influenced or affected that later decision.   
 
Complexity due to contextual dependence 
 
The complexity of algorithms is not restricted to the purely technical realm. Part of their 
complexity also arises at what perhaps is best perceived as the intersections of the arithmetic or 
logic of algorithms on the one hand and their application to the real world of human beings on 
the other.  Algorithms are contextual and relational as they perform tasks in collaboration with 
data, technologies, and people under varying conditions. Furthermore, the Big Data 
environment, in which algorithms are deployed, is in itself, relational and flexible.3 (Kitchin 
2013). Consequently, the effects of algorithms “unfold in contingent and relational ways, 
producing localised and situated outcomes,” as Kitchen notes (Kitchin 2016, 12). 
 
Algorithms can affect individuals (or groups of individuals) based on how the data suggest they 
might behave or should behave on the basis of patterns in the past, rather than based on the 
actual behaviour of the individuals (Ramirez 2013; Citron and Pasquale 2014; Zarsky 2014).  
Whereas the individual’s perception is influenced by his experience, emotions and values, 
algorithms are generally considered to start from available data and, therefore, to provide “sheer 
facts and truths”. Unfortunately, the widely shared view that “computer knows best” overlooks 
both the fact that data and algorithms may in many ways be biased or value-laden and the fact 
that algorithms always operate with a function that is itself value-driven, i.e. done for a purpose 
(although the outcomes are not always in conformity with that purpose). Put differently, 
algorithms are shaped by meanings and in turn construct new meaning (Roberge and Melancon 
2016, 3; see also Ananny 2016, 10).  
 
Take, for instance, random-group level operations. Random-group level operations are just one 
example of a type of complexities that is both due to the logic or technicality of algorithms and 
to their application to the real world, in this case of individuals and random groups of people.  
Algorithms search for patterns, correlations and commonalities hidden within large datasets 
(Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth 1996).  Algorithms prioritise, associate, classify, and 
filter information (Diakopoulos 2016). The new information found can serve as an immediate 
differentiation ground between individuals and between groups of individuals. Algorithms, 
however, can group together individuals on a random-group level and find currently undefined 
strata of society based upon, yet to be discovered, shared commonalities found within large data 
sets. The groups that have been thus created, might not be easily definable, nor in reality easily 
recognizable, due to their seemingly random nature.  
                                                 
3 According to Kitchin, Big Data is relational and flexible in nature, as a) Big Data contains common 
fields that “enable the conjoining of different data sets” and b) Big Data is both extensional and 
scalable, meaning new fields can be added easily, and the size of a dataset can expand rapidly 




Of course this already in itself makes it difficult to perceive the function of the algorithm and 
to predict its output and impact, but where random groups are involved, the outcomes can 
confront us with additional difficulties, since they will often be non-distributive. This means 
that they contain statements about average characteristics and patterns of behaviour or, in any 
case, about the individuals as members of the random group, rather than statements about the 
individuals in their own right. Both types of statements can be true, but they can be 
contradictory. Whereas a person may, as a member of a random group, run a statistically high 
risk of developing lung cancer, she may as an individual in her own right be the healthiest 
person on earth with a health prognosis for which many would envy her. Although both 
statements are true in a way, their meaning and function may be contraries. Their actual use 
will depend on the context and the perspective of the user. (Vedder 1999, 258). Grasping these 
outcomes will be difficult. As was already noted before, the commonalities of random groups 
are often not easily discernible. The groups can often only be identified by those who defined 
them for a specific purpose and not by the individuals affected by the statements. The latter 
might even consider the definition of the group as ‘arbitrarily chosen’ (ib.). 
 
Finally, under the label of contextual dependence, we should perhaps also mention proprietary 
or ownership aspects. Computer systems are often not the product of a single individual, but 
are developed as part of a corporate culture, being produced by teams (Nissenbaum 1994, 75). 
Corporations and professionals within those corporations who develop the algorithms belong 
to the context of algorithms. Corporations will often want to keep those algorithms secret for 
commercial reasons.   Burrell therefore ranks trade secrets among the main causes of opacity 
of algorithms, together with what he refers to as technical illiteracy, and opacity that arises from 
the characteristics of machine learning and the scale required to apply them usefully (Burrell 
2016). Of course, ownership is different from the other factors of complication. It is not so 
much an intellectual difficulty, but rather an impediment for understanding. Without having 
access to the algorithm, or the context in which the algorithm is deployed, it is difficult to assess 
whether or not algorithmic decision-making is desirable in a given situation. Yet the decision 
to maintain algorithmic secrecy is, other than technical or contextual complexity, a man-made 
decision, and thus not inherent to the functioning of algorithms.   
 
3. Accountability in Data Protection Legislation  
 
Algorithms process data, sometimes personal data. Data protection legislations, therefore, seem 
to be appealing candidates for regulating the responsible deployment of algorithms especially 
where human beings are affected by the data involved. Data protection legislation often has a 
broad material scope. The EU Data Protection framework, for instance, will apply as soon as 
a) there is a processing activity, i.e. any operation or set of operations performed on data and b) 
the processing activity concerns personal data, i.e. any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person.4 Since algorithms operate on data sets and many algorithms function 
through the use of personal data, algorithmic decision-making easily enters the ambit of the EU 
data protection framework.5 Algorithmic operations should respect the fundamental right to 
data protection and the deployment of algorithms should be in accordance with the fundamental 
                                                 
4 Art. 4 (1) GDPR. 
5 Art. 4 (2) GDPR. 
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principles related to the protection of personal data, such as fairness, transparency and 
accountability. Accountability, and closely related concepts such as transparency, are becoming 
even more important as guiding protection principles in the upcoming European General Data 
Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’). We have nonetheless some reservations concerning the 
sufficiency of these principles to safeguard the responsible deployment of algorithms.   
 
Accountability has often been considered as an important privacy and data protection enhancing 
principle (Bennett 2014; Guagnin et al. 2014; Zimmermann and Cabinakova 2015). The 
GDPR’s accountability principle reminds of the 1980 OECD privacy principles. These 
principles postulated accountability as a central privacy-enhancing principle stating that a data 
controller should be accountable for complying with measures, which give effect to the 
OECD’s privacy principles (OECD 1980). The OECD principles remain relevant and have 
shaped subsequent privacy and data protection legislation. The principles appoint for instance 
the data controller as the responsible party for ensuring compliance. The controller shall also 
have the responsibility of complying with measures that give effect to data protection principles 
(Alhadeff, 2012). The Regulation imposes upon the data controller the obligation to “be 
responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance with the principles relating to 
processing of personal data.6 Thus, within an algorithmic context, the data controller is to be 
held responsible and accountable for algorithmic decision-making.  
 
The principle of accountability as such is only mentioned explicitly twice in the GDPR; yet the 
principle permeates throughout the Regulation. In 2010 the Article 29 Working Party (hereafter: 
WP29) favoured the introduction of accountability and stated that the expected results of 
accountability mechanisms would “include the implementation of internal measures and 
procedures putting into effect existing data protection principles, ensuring their effectiveness 
and the obligation to prove this should data protection authorities request it”(WP29 2010). The 
WP29 also provided an illustrative list of potential measures, including an internal review and 
assessment, setting up binding data protection policies which should be made available to data 
subjects, mapping data processing operations and maintaining an inventory thereof, the 
appointment by the controller of a data protection officer, providing training and education to 
staff, setting up procedures to manage the subjective rights of data subjects, the implementation 
and supervision of verification procedures, et cetera. In the current GDPR text, many of these 
‘accountability’ measures have been introduced. According to the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS 2016), following the GDPR, accountability in personal data processing 
involves transparent internal policies, training employees, responsibility at the highest level for 
the monitoring of the implementation, assessment and demonstration to external parties of the 
implementation’s quality and procedure for redressing poor compliance and data breaches 
(EDPS 2016). Other examples of accountability obligations considered by the EDPS are: 
obligations to keep processing documentation, to install data security measures, to make a data 
protection impact assessment and to provide for data protection by design and default.  
 
                                                 
6 Art. 5 §2 GDPR. The principles relating to the processing of personal data and for which the data 
controller shall demonstrate compliance state that personal data shall be a) processed in a lawful 
fair and transparent manner; b) collected for specified explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; c) adequate, relevant and 
necessary to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed; d) accurate 
and, where necessary, kept up to data; kept in a for which permits identification of data subjects 
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed and f) 
processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data (Art. 5 §1 GDPR). 
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Therefore, and even though the GDPR only refers explicitly to accountability when imposing 
the obligation on the controller, to “be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance 
with data quality principles”, other – rather implicit – accountability mechanisms have been 
put in place, which in principle could enhance responsibility with regard to algorithmic 
decisions. Although accountability is not often explicitly and expressly mentioned, the 
regulation therefore seems to acknowledge and assert the underlying principles and starting 
points latently in various ways. In the subsequent subsection, we will discuss some of the guises 
of accountability in the GDPR.  
Self-Assessing Mechanisms of Accountability 
The primary notion of accountability as mentioned above, clearly requires the data controller 
to put in place specific mechanisms of accountability: the controller will have to assess whether 
or not the intended processing activities are in accordance with the law. Since this is primarily 
a responsibility for the controller, the controller himself should ensure that regulatory 
compliance is achieved. One of the main reasons the controller has been attributed more 
responsibility concerning the implementation of accountability measures under the GDPR was 
to increase the trust of individuals in the protection of their personal data in a digital 
environment (European Commission 2012, 42). In addition, increased accountability measures 
could also be considered a cost-reducing mechanism for ex-post, regulatory supervision 
requirements (European Commission 2012, 109). Some of these self-assessing mechanisms 
existed already under previous data protection frameworks. Nevertheless, under the GDPR, 
they have been expanded.  
The data controller should implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to 
ensure and to be able to demonstrate that the processing is performed in accordance with the 
GDPR.7 In doing so, the controller shall take into account “the nature, scope, context and 
purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons”.8 In this way, the GDPR encourages data protection by design and 
privacy by default, both at the time of determining the means for processing, as well as during 
the processing itself.9 The Regulation for instance refers to pseudonymization as a data 
protection by design mechanism to ensure data minimisation.10  
Article 30 requires the data controller to maintain a record of processing activities under its 
responsibilities.11 In this record, the controller has to provide information on amongst others 
the name and contact details of the controller or joint controllers12, the purposes of the 
processing activities13, a description of the categories of data subjects and of the categories of 
                                                 
7 Art. 24 §1 GDPR 
8 Ibid. 
9 Recital 78 GDPR and Art. 25 GDPR 
10 Art. 25 §1 GDPR 
11 Recital 82 GDPR and Art. 30 GDPR 
12 Art. 30 §1 (a) GDPR 
13 Art. 30 §1 (b) GDPR 
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personal data14, the recipients of data disclosure and possible data transfers15. Finally, the data 
controller should install internal data protection policies, assign responsibilities, raise 
awareness and train staff.16 
Another, and potentially stronger, accountability mechanism introduced by the GDPR, is the 
data protection impact assessment. A data controller is required to carry out an impact 
assessment of the intended processing operations on the protection of personal data where a 
type of processing is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons 
involved.17 This applies in particular to the use of new technologies.18 Such an assessment is 
specifically required in the case of a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects of 
natural persons, which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and which is to 
serve as a basis for decisions that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or affect 
the natural person significantly in a similar manner.19 This assessment must contain a 
systematic description of the intended processing activities, the purposes for the processing and 
the legitimate interest lying at its basis, the necessity and proportionality of the processing 
operations in relation to the purposes. An assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the 
processing operations in relation to the purposes and an assessment of the risks to the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects and the measures envisaged to address the risks of the processing 
activity, must also be included in the impact assessment.20 The impact assessment is a form of 
accountability as it necessitates the data controller to make an analysis of the desirability of his 
actions and their impact in a high risk context. 
The right not to be subject to automated decision-making  
The right not to be subject to automated decision-making targets the involved individual 
directly.21 Article 22 GDPR states that the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal 
effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. Moreover, as it covers 
automated decision-making, it also covers algorithmic processing activities. Indeed, automated 
decisions have an algorithmic underpinning. Therefore, this subjective right might also be 
considered an eminent mechanism to address undesirable effects of algorithmic decision-
making. The nature of this right is inherently limited however as it only relates to ‘solely 
                                                 
14 Art. 30 §1 (c) GDPR. The categories chosen by the data controller should be necessary in order to 
achieve the defined data processing purposes. Although no concrete definition of “category” is 
provided, the term seems to refer to the overall category to which the specific types of information 
of the data subject processed by the controller would belong. Categories could be ‘name’ or ‘address’. 
The name and address of the data subject would then belong to these respective categories. The 
GDPR does refer to ‘special categories of data’. These data reveal information concerning racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetics, 
health, sex life, etc. 
15 Art. 30 §1 (d) GDPR 
16 Art. 24 and 39 GDPR 
17 Recitals 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 and 96 GDPR and Art. 35 GDPR 
18 Art. 35 §1 GDPR 
19 Recital 91 GDPR and Art 35 §3 (a) GDPR. A data protection impact assessment also has to be 
performed when a) processing activities take place on a large scale of special categories of data, e.g. 
personal data revealing racial or ethnic, political or religious beliefs or genetic information and b) 
there is a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale. 
20 Art. 35 §7 (b) and (c) GDPR. 
21 Recital 71 GDPR and Art. 22 GDPR 
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automated’ processes and not to algorithmic processes in general. In other words, once there is 
a human in the loop guiding the algorithm, the decision-making process might no longer be 
considered to be a ‘solely’ automated one. Furthermore, the article’s wording suggests that it is 
not simply meant to serve as a safeguard for merely an individual’s data protection; it also sees 
to other interests and rights. Regardless of whether personal data are adequately protected, if 
the automated process produces legal effects concerning the individual or significantly affects 
the individual, the right can be asserted. Further clarification on what a ‘legal effect’ or 
‘significant impact’ on the individual could be, is missing. The GDPR considers an automatic 
refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting practices without any human intervention 
as having a ‘significant’ impact on the individual,22 but it remains unclear what other decision-
making processes could be categorised as such.  
Although not mentioned explicitly, the exercise of the right not to be subject depends upon 
strong accountability mechanisms towards the individual. The effective exercise of this right 
requires that the data subject is adequately informed, i.e. the data subject must receive an 
account of the automated decision, the underlying algorithmic processes and the ultimate 
impact of the decision. The right does not apply however, when the automated process is 
necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data 
controller; authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and 
which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests; or when the individual has given explicit consent for the automated 
decision.23 In these cases, the GDPR stipulates that the data subject should be informed about 
the existence of the automated decision and should receive meaningful information about the 
logic involved, as well as the consequences and the significance of the processing for the data 
subject.24 The GDPR even provides additional safeguards if the data subject is not granted the 
right not to be subject: the data controller must then implement suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject’s rights, freedoms and legitimate interests, and the data subject shall have at 
least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her 
point of view and to contest the decision.25 This means that the controller is accountable for the 
automated decision and that the data subject should receive an account by the data controller 
on how the decision will be made and what the impact might be.  
Transparency  
Transparency is often considered to be a key component of efficient accountability frameworks: 
“An actor’s conduct can only be compared to some standards if the conduct if its consequences 
can be observed by a forum”(Zimmermann and Cabinakova, 2015). Thus transparency should 
ensure that the algorithmic process can be observed and information regarding its future 
behaviour is provided. Transparency is also an integral principle within data protection 
frameworks, and especially within the GDPR. The GDPR requires data processing activities to 
be transparent, which entails that any information and communication concerning the 
processing of personal data should be easily accessible, easy to understand and conveyed 
                                                 
22 Recital 71 GDPR. 
23 Recital 71 GDPR and Art. 22 §2 (b). GDPR. 
24 See Recital 63 GDPR and Art. 4 (1) GDPR, Art. 13 §2 (f) GDPR, Art. .14 §2 (g) GDPR and Art. 15 
§1 (h) GDPR. 
25 Recital 71 and Art. 22 § 3 GDPR 
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through clear and plain language.26 The transparency required is concerned with the identity of 
the data controller, the purposes for which processing activities are performed, but also the data 
that are being processed, the duration of data storage,27 or as mentioned above, the logic of the 
automata underlying the processing activities.28  
Transparency defined in this manner, could pave the way towards algorithmic accountability.  
It should also be noted that transparency as a data protection enhancing measure is aimed 
towards everyone: data processing activities should be conveyed to the general public in a 
transparent manner in order for the public to be able to make informed decisions.  
 
4. Accountability in the GDPR Sufficient for Algorithmic Accountability? 
In section 2, we saw that algorithms in a Big Data setting are difficult to understand for a variety 
of reasons. Algorithms are complex on a technical level due to their language, the manner in 
which they are programmed, and their dependence on other algorithms and data.  They are also 
complicated due to their contextual dependence because of which they can be both value-laden 
and produce significant transformations in a latent way. Algorithmic accountability can only be 
achieved if this algorithmic complexity can be overcome in a manner that enables a clear 
understanding of the algorithmic decision-making process. Can the accountability mechanisms 
inherent in the GDPR fulfil this task?  
 
First, accountability as a data protection enhancing mechanism as it is described in general 
terms in the GDPR may only in part be applied in a meaningful way to algorithms in a Big Data 
context, i.e. only to the degree that the input- and output data are personal data according to the 
definition of the GDPR. Algorithms in a Big Data context, however, although often relating to 
human beings, do not necessarily use or produce personal data in the strict sense, as we have 
seen in the case of random-group operations. These might therefore not be covered by the 
accountability mechanisms in the GDPR. Second, the accountability mechanisms of the GDPR 
do not entirely clarify towards whom algorithmic decision-makers should be considered to be 
accountable; they only point out to whom they should be accountable when algorithmic 
decision-makers process personal data. Algorithmic activities, however, do not necessarily 
require personal data to be processed in order to have a significant impact. Neither does the 
application of an algorithmic result to the individual or society imply a necessity for personal 
data processing. Even though personal data processing might have been required initially, the 
algorithmic result might be applied in concrete reality, leaving the ultimate decision outside the 
scope of data protection legislation. The latter might also be the case if anonymized data are 
used. We will return to the issue of the forum of accountability towards the end of this section. 
 
One might think that transparency might be of help. Transparency as such, however, does not 
constitute accountability (Zimmermann and Cabinakova, 2015, 266-267). 29 Although it 
certainly facilitates the informed assessment of the desirability of a decision, Kroll et al. have 
expressed serious doubts regarding transparency as a regulatory mechanism with regard to the 
                                                 
26 See inter alia Recitals 39, 58 and78 GDPR and Articles 5 §1 (a)and 12 GDPR: 
27 Ibid.  
28 See Recital 63 GDPR and Art. 4 (1) GDPR, Art. 13 §2 (f) GDPR, Art. .14 §2 (g) GDPR and Art. 15 
§1 (h) GDPR. 
29 Ibid.  
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technical dimensions of algorithms. First, they deem corporate secrecy to be an un almost 
insurmountable impediment, and, second, they tend to consider the source code of the 
algorithms involved eventually unintelligible (Kroll et al, 2017). Although corporate secrecy 
and the intelligibility of the technical basics of the algorithms certainly raise big problems, they 
do not exclude the possibility of creating transparency in many other respects completely. 
Moreover, if the focus is too much on an algorithm’s technicity and particularly on the manner 
in which it is programmed, one might lose sight of the contextual framework in which the 
algorithm operates. Transparency with regard to contextual factors such as the purpose or 
functions assigned to algorithms, for instance, can still be created – and, perhaps better, should 
be created. Although information concerning the purposes of data processing activities, and 
thus algorithms, the envisaged consequences, and the data collected and processed, should be 
given by the data controller, regardless of his forum (the individual or supervisory authority), 
this information might still not be enough to ensure algorithmic accountability or an assessment 
of the algorithm’s desirability. A data controller might in complete accordance with the 
transparency requirements of the GDPR provide information regarding the purpose of the use 
of algorithmic decision-making,  and the amount and categories of data collected for achieving 
this purpose, but yet leave it unknown how the decision was exactly made, e.g. which 
component in the decision-making process was assigned most weight. Even though the GDPR 
rules, for example, now require transparency with regard to the logic involved in algorithmic 
decision making30, they do not specify what level of information constitutes compliance: is it 
the mathematical sequence of the algorithm or the substantial argumentation that could lie at 
the basis of the decision? It should once again be noticed that in an algorithmic context, the 
exact purpose for data processing may often remain undetermined too, or might at least be 
subject to change as algorithms actively search for new purposes to make use of data. Moreover, 
this purpose-seeking is one of Big Data’s main attractions. This is one of the reasons why a 
posteriori accountability is important with regard to the use of algorithms in a Big Data context. 
 
Concerning the mechanisms of processing records and impact assessment, the legislator 
stipulates that a supervisory authority, such as the national data protection authority, could gain 
insight into these records, or in the case where the impact assessment indicates high risk, should 
gain insight.31 Where the impact assessment would ultimately indicate that processing would 
result in a high risk and the controller clearly has not taken measures taken to manage the risk, 
the controller has an obligation to consult with the supervisory authority prior to the 
performance of the processing activities.  Both the processing records and impact assessment 
requirements provide a double accountability purpose: they facilitate the controller’s self-
assessment, whereas they also facilitate the task of the authority in assessing the compliance of 
the controller’s data processing activities. It remains to be seen, however, whether, in practice, 
algorithmic risks can be adequately mapped.  For instance, even though the GDPR recognizes 
discrimination as a potential risk of processing activities32, differentiation is often inherent to 
algorithmic activities, and as we will describe below, it is not always easy to determine whether 
this differentiation should be considered discriminatory or non-discriminatory, or fair or unfair. 
It should also be noticed that an impact assessment is an a priori mechanism, whereas 
accountability is usually an a posteriori one. In an algorithmic context, however, a priori 
                                                 
30 Art. 14 § 2 (g) GDPR. 
31 Art. 30 §4 GDPR and Art.36 GDPR. 
32 See for instance Recital 75 GDPR, where it is stated that the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, such as the risk of discrimination, may result of data processing.  
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assessments concerning the potential impact of an algorithm remains difficult due to the 
possibility of unpredictable outcomes. 
 
The right not to be subject to automated decision-making primarily vests power in the 
individual. The initial accountability and information requirements, however, do relieve the 
burden that comes along with this power.33 Accountability towards the individual is appealing. 
Rather than relying upon the legal framework to determine potentially hazardous processing 
activities, the individual can decide whether or not to be subject to a processing act, regardless 
of how the legal framework has qualified that act. This is a form of privacy and data protection 
as “self-management” (Solove 2012). Grasping the impact of the decision is not an easy task 
for the individual, however, and neither would it be for the data controller. Moreover, this 
assessment would have to be made on a regular basis by the data subject, especially if automated 
decision-making is to become omnipresent. As Obar rightfully comments: “even if the digital 
citizen had the faculties and the system for privacy self-management, the digital citizen has 
little time for data governance” (Obar, 2015).  
 
Furthermore, as was explained in section 3, the right not to be subject cannot always be 
exercised by the data subject.34 If the right cannot be exercised, the data controller must 
implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate 
interests and the data subject should, at least, have the right to obtain human intervention from 
the controller, the opportunity to express his or her point of view and the ability to contest the 
decision.35 The exercise of these additional rights however also presupposes a sound 
understanding of the algorithmic processes and perhaps even the power to  have algorithms 
reconsidered by a human decision-maker. Indeed, the mathematical basis and seemingly 
rational nature of algorithms might grant the automated decision de facto validity against which 
the human actor might not be inclined to decide negatively.  
 
With regard to the suitable measures to be implemented by the data controller, the GDPR does 
specify that, in the case of profiling, the controller should use appropriate mathematical or 
statistical procedures.36 The technical and organisational measures taken should furthermore be 
appropriate “to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data 
are corrected and that the risk of errors is minimised.”37 Personal data should also be secured 
and particular attention must be provided to the risks involved for rights and interests of the 
data subject.38 Technical and organisational measures should, for instance, serve to prevent the 
discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, 
religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or 
that result in measures having such an effect. Having sound mathematics and statistics however, 
does not overcome the potential dangers of the algorithm’s contextual complexity. Moreover, 
and even though the recognition of the potentially discriminatory effects of algorithms deserves 
praise, in an algorithmic context, it is advisable not to exclusively focus on the ‘characteristics’ 
or ‘salient traits’ usually associated with discrimination and anti-discrimination legislation. 
                                                 
33 According to the CIPL, accountability does not displace the individual’s ability to assert his rights, 
but it serves to relieve the data subject of much of the burden of policing the marketplace for 
enterprises using data irresponsibly. 
34 Art. 22 §2 GDPR. 
35 Art. 22 §3 GDPR. 





Rather, a broad notion of unfair differentiation should be applied, which includes forms of 
unequal treatment not yet covered by the law. In the case of random group-profiles for example, 
no ‘salient trait’, linking all affected individuals, is likely to be detected. The individuals within 
the group might nonetheless be unfairly judged and treated on the basis of the differentiation of 
the group in comparison with others (Vedder 1999). We will return to this again towards the 
end of this section. 
 
It might also be doubted whether a data subject might truly be able to contest a decision. Should 
the right not to be subject be asserted, the controller should be in a position to provide a 
verifiable account of how and when automated decision-making might impact the individual. 
An algorithm, and the resulting decision, must thus first be interpretable for the controller in 
order for him to effectively render the relevant information to the data subject. The technical 
and contextual complexity of an algorithm might undermine true understanding, not only for 
the controller, but also for the algorithm’s designer.  
 
In addition, the right not to be subject is of little help to individuals whose data have not been 
collected, but who are nonetheless affected by the algorithm. Here one may think of algorithmic 
information, in the form of profiles, used for selection purposes in the real world, such as a job 
interview or local advertisements. To put it differently: Algorithms sometimes only inform 
decisions affecting individuals, instead of taking the decisions directly through automated 
processes. Consequences such as these might require a rethinking of the power to be allotted to 
algorithms as a basis for decision-making.  
 
The forum of accountability is an issue of concern regarding the GDPR. Within the context of 
data protection legislation, the Centre for Information Policy Leadership has identified three 
key parties to whom organisations may be considered to be accountable: individuals, regulators 
and organisations (CIPL, 2009). In the GDPR, the responsibility of the controller regarding 
compliance with data protection principles, seems to be targeted towards all three parties, yet 
due to its scope of protection, the primary subject towards whom accountability should 
eventually, and considering the scope of protection, perhaps ideally,  be given, is the data 
subject, the individual whose data is being collected. The data subject is defined as an identified 
or identifiable living natural person, meaning an individual who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly. As we have seen, however, algorithms do often not only affect data subjects as 
individuals as such. Of course a group profile can sometimes make the individuals involved 
directly or indirectly identifiable. It is difficult, however, to uphold a focus on natural persons 
in cases that affect large groups in society or potentially everyone (Van Der Sloot, 2015, 9). 
More often than not, that will even more saliently be the case where random groups – even not 
so large ones – are concerned (Vedder, 1995).  
 
Interestingly, the GDPR mentions the possibility of another forum toward which the processor 
could be held accountable in addition to the affected data subject. That forum is the European 
Data Protection Board. The European Data Protection Board can, on its own initiative or, where 
relevant, at the request of the Commission, issue guidelines, recommendations and best 
practices for further specification the criteria and conditions for decisions based on profiling 
pursuant to art. 22 GDPR.39 Even if the EDPB were to seriously take up this role as a forum of 
accountability, it should be kept in mind that algorithmic decision-making affects more societal 
interests than data protection alone. Especially on the basis of their possible roles with regard 
                                                 
39 Art. 70 §1 (f). GDPR. 
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to record keeping and data protection risk assessments as stipulated in the GDPR, Mantelero is 
of the opinion that data protection authorities could play a key role within a Big Data setting 
(Mantelero, 2016, 252). But can national or even supranational data authorities overcome the 
complexities of algorithms in a Big Data setting? Can they do justice to all of the interests 
possibly involved? In order to effectively exercise other autonomous rights and legitimate 
interests affected by data processing activities, safeguarding multi-stakeholder involvement 
seems necessary, even though many of the risks involved in Big Data analytics will still remain 
not assessable a priori.40 The data protection invasive character of a given technology might be 
discerned; yet, due to algorithms operating on a random-group level, unfair differentiation 
might not. Differential treatment can be an inherent consequence of the functions algorithms 
perform. Prioritization, classification, association and filtering algorithms, are known to result 
in unfair differential treatment and discrimination (see inter alia De Hert, 2012, Barocas and 
Selbst, 2016; Diakopoulos, 2016; Kroll et al. 2017). Reliance on equality and non-
discrimination legislation, however, is also problematic against this algorithmic backdrop. As 
computational capabilities increase, algorithms will be able to differentiate between individuals 
and groups on the basis of an increasing number of parameters in an ever increasing variety of 
contexts. Substantive equality law is built around comprehensively enumerated, pre-defined 
contexts, e.g. employment or education, or grounds, e.g. gender, race, religion (Le Métayer and 
Le Clainche, 2012, 325). Algorithms do not merely affect individuals, they also affect the group 
as a whole and set groups apart from the rest of society (Vedder, 1995, 258, Mantelero, 2016). 
Yet, as mentioned, the qualification of differential treatment as being unfair should not 
necessarily be linked to historically disadvantaged groups or types of discrimination already 
defined within the law as Custers et al.(2013) seem to suggest. The risk of unfair differentiation 
increases as more classification acts are performed by algorithms, although, of course, the 
opposite is also true, i.e. that fair differentiation might increase as well (which is not meant to 
suggest that in an algorithmic environment, fair and unfair differentiation can be simply  




Accountability with regard to algorithms in a Big Data context, can only thrive in a culture in 
which algorithms are considered as more than mere data processing activities. As the effects of 
                                                 
40 Though a multi-stakeholder approach seems desirable or even necessary, it does bring along additional 
difficulties. In particular, multi-stakeholder involvement, must be reconciled with other fields of law, 
such as competition law. Furthermore, due to conflicting interests, private or public entities might 
not be willing to participate with other private or public entities. In his interesting contribution to a 
2014 study of the French State Council (Conseil D’Etat) concerning Fundamental Freedoms and 
Digital Technologies and Rights, Pierre Bellanger argues in favour of a single Data Agency. The 
contribution elaborates upon the collective nature of data, wherein the author argues that data should 
be governed as a common good. Within this context, Bellanger introduces the Data Agency. He 
considers that competition among entities should not focus on the ownership of data but its use. This, 
in turn, would stimulate each company to design the best computer programs to derive meaning and 
value. However, Bellanger notes that any gathering or processing of personal data should receive 
authorisation from the Data Agency, before any individual agreement. Although far-going in his 
approach, it does illustrate that some voices are in favour of a centralised ‘data control’ agency. 
Bellanger, Pierre. 2015. «Les données personnelles : une question de souveraineté», Le Débat 
183:14-25, DOI 10.3917/deba.183.0014. 
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algorithms transcend the realm of data protection, so must the approach in algorithmic 
accountability. Accountability by algorithmic decision-makers should not be solely based on 
data protection principles, nor merely targeted towards a data protection entity as its primary 
forum. In order to achieve accountability, the controller himself will first have to assess the 
desirability of algorithmic decision-making, taking into account the larger context in which the 
algorithms will be deployed. As such, impact assessments could be a first step towards having 
a more accountable algorithmic culture. Moreover, if risks become apparent, design strategies 
could be further developed in order to make decision-making more transparent. Yet, given the 
variety of potential interests affected, the actual impact of algorithms, will often remain 
undetermined a priori. Furthermore, given the technical, relational and contextual nature of 
algorithms operating within a Big Data environment, the entity towards whom accountability 
should ultimately be given is not easily determined. An extensive knowledge exchange between 
technically savvy individuals, ethicists, non-governmental organizations, business corporations 
and a broad variety of other possible stakeholders is likely to be required in order to overcome 
the algorithmic complexity described in section 2. If processors are to be held accountable 
towards one supervisory authority representing specific interests or values, one might run the 
risk that certain affected interests and potential spill over effects of algorithmic decisions into 
other decisions or sectors are overlooked. The latter would for instance be the case when an 
algorithmic decision is taken in a credit-scoring context as a credit score might also affect an 
individual’s other opportunities in life. Therefore, oversight mechanisms are also needed, which 
enable algorithm intensive industries to be monitored in order to identify future threats to 
societal values in due time. Perhaps then, and similar to non-discrimination legislation, contexts 
could be identified in which certain algorithmic risks have become apparent in a more tangible 
manner and where, in turn, authorities could be established towards which processers can be 
held accountable in a more effective manner. The GDPR already hints towards such an 
approach when it encourages associations or other bodies representing categories of controllers 
or processors to draw up codes of conduct, taking into account the characteristics of the sectors 
in which they operate.41 Indeed, the GDPR’s preamble specifies that such codes should be 
drawn up through multi-stakeholder involvement and consultation. The preamble moreover 
notes that codes of conduct could, in particular, “calibrate the obligations of controllers and 
processors, taking into account the risk likely to result from the processing for the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons.”42 Unfortunately, the notions ‘stakeholder involvement’ and 
‘obligation calibration’, are not mentioned in the GDPR’s main body of text nor are they ever 
further specified.43 Although codes of conducts do not constitute accountability, they could 
serve as building blocks for a more accountable algorithmic environment. And as our 
familiarity with and our knowledge of algorithmic activities increases, so may our ability to 
translate the risks and effects of algorithms towards the general public.  
                                                 
41 See inter alia Recitals 98, 99 GDPR and art. 40 GDPR. 
42 Recital 98 and 99 GDPR. 
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